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CYBERPORN AND CENSORSHIP:
CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO
PREVENTING ACCESS TO INTERNET
PORNOGRAPHY BY MINORS
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Reno v. ACLU,' the Supreme Court ruled on the constitu-
tionality of two provisions of the Communications Decency Act
of 1996.2 Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act
(CDA) in order to curtail the dissemination of pornography to
minors via the Internet.3 The Court found two provisions of the
CDA to be unconstitutional due to their vagueness and the chill-
ing effect their application would have on Internet communica-
tions.4
This Note concludes that the Court's holding was correct in
light of established First Amendment precedent. The Court's
application of strict scrutiny5 was proper given the importance
of the right to free expression. While the Government has a le-
gitimate and compelling interest in protecting minors from
sexually explicit material that may be harmful to them,6 the
CDA was not narrowly tailored to conform to the Government's
7
narrow prerogative in this area.
This Note argues that any future attempt to regulate sexu-
ally explicit Internet transmissions must be drafted with suffi-
cient specificity such that no ambiguity exists as to the scope of
its enforcement.8  This Note also rejects the Government's
stance that regulation of Internet pornography is justified as an
'117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
2 47 U.S.C. §§ 223 (a), (d) (Supp. 1997).
3 See 141 CONG. REc. S8088 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon)
("The fundamental purpose of the Communications Decency Act is to provide much-
needed protection for children.").
4 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
'Id. at 2344.
iId. at 2346.
7 id at 2348.
8 See infra Part V.B.
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exercise of its zoning power. The interpretation of the CDA
under a zoning paradigm undermines the foundations of free
expression and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.9
II. BACKGROUND
In recent years, the Supreme Court has struggled to prevent
access by minors to speech that may harm them, while safe-
guarding the First Amendment right of adults to engage in non-
obscene speech. The Court has addressed the constitutionality
of restricting the rights of minors to access constitutionally pro-
tected speech 0 in a variety of fora." Generally, the Court meas-
ures the Government's interest in protecting minors from




It is well established that the Government lawfully may im-
pose different regulations on minors than it does on adults. In
Ginsberg v. New York,' 2 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
New York statute 3 forbidding the sale to minors under age sev-
enteen of material considered obscene as to them, although not
necessarily obscene for adults. 4 However, the Government does
not have unlimited regulatory powers to protect minors. When
a statute has the effect of restricting adults to viewing only mate-
rial suitable for children, it will be stricken down. 5
9 See infra Part V.D.
" Protected speech is that which is normally entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment. Expression such as obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23
(1973), "fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), or
speech that creates a "clear and present danger," Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919), traditionally lacks constitutional protection, and thus may be regu-
lated.
" See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989)
(telephone communications); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (ra-
dio transmissions); Miller, 413 U.S. at 18 (unsolicited mail).
12 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
" N.Y. PENALLAW § 484-h (McKinney 1909).
14 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631-33.
" See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983) (holding
that a statute prohibiting mailing of unsolicited advertisements for birth control was
1016 [Vol. 88
1998] CYBERPORNAND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1017
Although Congress cannot prevent adults from viewing ma-
terial inappropriate for minors, it does have the authority to
16limit adult access to material that is obscene, transmitted in an
inappropriate context,17 or that creates harmful secondary ef-
fects. 8 For example, in Miller v. California,19 the Court reviewed
the conviction of an individual who mailed unsolicited, sexually
explicit material in violation of California law 0 The Court in
Miller constructed the modern definition of "obscene"21:
[t] he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the av-
erage person, applying contemporary community standards" would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value.2
unconstitutional as applied to producer of contraceptives) (citing Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
16 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23 (upholding conviction of individual who mailed unsolic-
ited, sexually explicit material); A Book Named 'John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman
of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (declaring an eighteenth cen-
tury book with some social value not obscene) [hereinafter Memoirs]; Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (upholding conviction of California man who mailed
sexually explicit circulars and advertisements).
'7 See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 130-31 (1989) (find-
ing a ban on indecent "dial-a-porn" telephone messages to be overbroad); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 742 (1978) (upholding a ban on radio broadcasts when
indecent "as aired").
" See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (upholding
zoning regulation directed at adult movie theaters); Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976) (same).
9 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
20 Id at 16-18.
21 In Miller, the Court refined the previous tests set out in Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957), and Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). In Roth, the Court noted that ob-
scene material: (1) lacks redeeming social importance; and (2) to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, appeals to the prurient interest. Roth,
354 U.S. at 484, 489. The Memoirs Court interpreted Roth as requiring that:
Three elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex; (b)
the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c)
the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 489) (other citations omitted).
The Millerstandards apply to federal legislation as well as state laws. SeeUnited States
v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (upholding California's
seizure of obscene material pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (a)).
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The Supreme Court views obscenity as completely outside the
scope of the First Amendment's protection, and the Govern-
ment may regulate speech freely as long as the Miller test is ful-
filled.23
2. Regulation of Speech on Particular Media
Furthermore, the fact that speech is not obscene is not nec-
essarily sufficient to preclude Government regulation. The Su-
preme Court has allowed the Government to restrict speech in
various media where the fundamental nature of the media make
such restrictions acceptable.24 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the
Court held that the radio broadcast of a monologue entitled
Filthy Words, previously delivered to a live audience by comedian
George Carlin, "'could have been the subject of administrative
sanctions.' 26 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
determined that the monologue was patently offensive and in-
decent as aired,27 because it involved the repeated use of words
referring to excretory or sexual activities or organs "in an after-
noon broadcast when children are in the audience."28
The Pacifica plurality stated that regulation dependent on
the content of speech does not violate the First Amendment per
se.29 Instead, the context of the broadcast is critical in determin-
ing the scope of constitutional protection.30 Noting that broad-
casting traditionally has received the most limited First
Amendment protection,3' the Court concluded that the ease
with which children may listen to the radio weighed against the
constitutional protection of indecent broadcasts.3 2 It is there-
Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24.
24 See e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374,
2386-87 (1996) (leased cable television channels may be regulated, but not public ac-
cess channels); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (radio). But see
Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-28 (1989) (nature of tele-
phone makes indecent recorded messages protected against regulation).
2438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Id. at 730 (quoting Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI
(FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975)).




so Id. at 744-48.
Id. at 748.
32 Id. at 749-50.
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fore constitutional to proscribe indecent, non-obscene speech
when such speech is transmitted through a medium readily ac-
cessible to children.
However, in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,33
the Supreme Court refused to uphold a ban on indecent "dial-a-
porn" telephone communications.3 Sable Communications, a
provider of sexually oriented prerecorded messages, brought
suit to enjoin enforcement of 47 U.S.C. § 223(b).s The 1988
amendment to § 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934
created an outright ban on indecent or obscene interstate
commercial telephone messages.- Applying strict scrutiny, the
Court found that the statute was not sufficiently narrowly drawn
to serve the Government's compelling interest in protecting
minors.s7 Furthermore, the Court distinguished Pacifica on the
basis that it involved the unique attributes of broadcasting, and
did not mandate a complete ban. s In Pacifica, there was a risk
that listeners would hear Carlin's monologue by accident. In
contrast, the probability that one would fortuitously encounter
an indecent telephone message is reduced substantially by the
affirmative steps one must take to access those messages.
Most recently, in Denver Area Education Telecommunications
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,40 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of three portions of the Cable Television Con-
sumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,'41 each attempt-
ing to regulate programming on cable television. 2 The first of
these regulations, § 10(a), allowed cable operators to ban pat-
ently offensive material on leased access channels. 3 The sec-
ond, § 10(c), authorized the same bans for public access
channels." If cable operators did not take advantage of these






39 Id. at 127-28.
'0 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
4, 106 Stat. 1486 §§ 10(a)-(c) (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 532(j), and
note following § 531 (Supp. 1997)).
42 116 S. Ct. at 2380.
See 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. 1997).
14 See note following 47 U.S.C.A. § 531 (West Supp. 1997).
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provisions, § 10(b) mandated that they place all patently offen-
sive programming on a single channel, and only allow custom-
ers to access that channel after providing written
authorization.45
The Denver AreaJustices could not settle upon a single level
of scrutiny to apply, and the Court's decision came down as a
patchwork of shifting pluralities. When the dust settled, the
leased access provision (§ 10(a)) was held constitutional, 46 thepublic access provision (§ 10(c)) was held unconstitutional, 47
and the provision mandating segregation of patently offensive
material (§ 10(b)) also was held unconstitutional.4 ' Denver Area
clearly illustrates the Court's continuing willingness to engage
in medium-specific analysis-evaluating regulations within the




Using a wholly different mode of analysis, the Court upheld
a zoning ordinance that prevented adult movie theaters from
opening in residential neighborhoods in City of Renton v. Play-
time Theatres, Inc.50 The Court acknowledged the district court's
finding that the ordinance was aimed not at the content of the
films shown in the theaters, but rather at the impact such estab-
lishments have on their surrounding neighborhood, including
rising crime rates and deteriorating property values.5 ' The
Court upheld the statute, holding that a state has a legitimate
See 47 U.S.C. § 532(j) (Supp. 1997).
Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2390 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion); id. at 2417 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17 Id. at 2394 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion); id. at 2417 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
"' Id. at 2394 (BreyerJ., plurality opinion).
'9 See id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion) ("This Court, in different contexts,
has consistently held that the government may directly regulate speech to address ex-
traordinary problems, where its regulations are appropriately tailored to resolve those
problems without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech."); see also
Christopher M. Kelly, Note, "The Spectre of a 'Wired Nation'": Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC and First Amendment Analysis in Cyberspace, 10
HARV.J.L. & TzcH. 559, 578 (1997).
475 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1986). See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding two Detroit zoning laws preventing adult theaters from be-
ing constructed near each other or residential neighborhoods).
-" Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
1020 [Vol. 88
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interest in protecting property values and discouraging crime,
and therefore may proscribe speech to serve these interests as
long as the content of the restricted speech is not considered.
52
The Court was explicit in limiting its holding only to statutes
that combat the "secondary effects" of speech without regard to
its content.
53
Had the regulation instead been found to be "content-
based," firmly established principles would have made it pre-
sumptively invalid. Six years later, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,54
the Court addressed a St. Paul ordinance55 proscribing the use
of symbolic speech, "which one knows or has a reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others
on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender .. .
The defendant was prosecuted for burning a cross in the yard of
an African-American family.5 7 The Court struck down the ordi-
nance, noting that it allowed individuals to engage in insulting
or violence-provoking speech as long as such speech was not di-
rected to one of the enumerated disfavored topics. Justice
Scalia stated that "[tihe First Amendment generally prevents
government from proscribing speech, or even expressive con-
duct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed."5 9 Thus, in
order to survive constitutional review, a statute restricting pro-
tected speech must be directed at factors extrinsic to the con-
tent of the message, rather than at the viewpoint expressed.6°
B. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCYACT OF 1996
Against this backdrop of First Amendment case law,6' Con-
gress passed the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).
5 Id. at 48-55.
53 Id. at 54.
'4 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
"ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
7 id. at 379.
"Id. at 391.
Id. at 382 (citations omitted).
6Id. at 396.
6' The sponsors of the CDA were fully aware of the Court's First Amendment
precedents:
The conferees intend that the term indecency... has the same meaning as es-
tablished in FCC v. Pacfica Foundation and Sable Communications of California, Inc.
v. FCC These cases clearly establish the principle that the federal government
has a compelling interest in shielding minors from indecency. Moreover, these
1998] 1021
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The CDA is codified in Title V of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996.62 The purpose of the CDA is to prevent minors from
receiving sexually explicit material over the Internet-a goal
furthered by the use of criminal sanctions.r" Section
223(a) (1) (B) of the CDA punishes by fine, imprisonment or
both, the knowing transmission of "obscene or indecent" com-
munications to any person under eighteen years of age.6s Sec-
tion 223(d) prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of
"patently offensive" messages to persons under eighteen years of
age. Affirmative defenses are provided under § 223(e) (5) for
cases firmly establish the principle that the indecency standard is fully consistent
with the Constitution and specifically limited in its reach so that the term is not
unconstitutionally vague.
H.R. CoNF. REP,. No. 104-458, at 422 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 201, 201-02
(internal citations omitted). However, awareness is not synonymous with compre-
hension, a fact made clear by the Reno Court's clear refutation of the Conference Re-
port's latter observation.
12 SeePub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
63 See 141 CONG. REC. S8088 (daily ed.June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
"47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. 1997).
6' 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1) (B) (Supp. 1997). The provision reads in relevant part:
Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications-
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is
obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18
years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the call
or initiated the communication; ....
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1) (B) (Supp. 1997).
6Section 223(d) provides:
Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons
under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a
person under 18 years of age,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that,
in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contem-
porary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of
whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's con-
trol to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be
used for such activity,
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (Supp. 1997).
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those who make "good faith" and "effective" efforts to restrict
access by minors to prohibited communications.67
Senator James Exon (D-Neb.) originally proposed the CDA
in 1 9 9 5 .68 Despite some resistance to the indecency provisions,
Senator Exon and a coalition of right-wing and anti-
pornography groups were able to maintain the bill in its original
form.69 In an 84 to 16 vote, the Exon amendment was attached
to the Senate's telecommunications bill in June of 1995.70 How-
ever, the House version of the legislation expressly prohibited
Internet censorship and was passed by a 420 to 4 vote.7 In the
joint conference committee, the House participants abandoned
their measure and adopted Senator Exon's proposal. 2
C. THE INTERNET
A discussion of the Communications Decency Act should
begin with a brief overview of the mechanics of the Internet.
The Internet is a complex network of computers, linked for the
Whether § 223(d) should be treated as one substantive section or two was the sub-
ject of debate between the Justices. The dissent viewed the section as comprised of
two separate provisions. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2352 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). The "specific person" provision, § 223(d) (1) (A), governs transmissions
to a specific person the sender knows to be under age 18. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing). The "display" provision, § 223(d) (1) (B), more broadly applies to the posting of
patently offensive messages or images in any manner available to minors. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority treated the section as consisting of only one
"patently offensive display," provision, thereby avoiding the issue of a transmission
purposefully directed at a known minor. Id. at 2338 n.25.
'7 Section 223(e) (5) provides that:
It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a) (1) (B) or (d) of this
section, or under subsection (a) (2) of this section with respect to the use of a fa-
cility for an activity under subsection (a) (1) (B) of this section that a person-
(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate ac-
tions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a com-
munication specified in such subsections, which may involve any appropriate
measures to restrict minors from such communications, including any method
which is feasible under available technology; or
(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use of a
verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identifi-
cation number.
47 U.S.C. § 223(e) (5) (Supp. 1997).
SeeS. 314, 104th Cong. (1995)
See Blake T. Bilstad, Obscenity and Indecency in a Digital Age The Legal and Political
Implications of Cybersmut, VIrtual Pornography, and the Communications Decency Act of 1996,
13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & GH TEC. LJ. 321, 375 (1997).
70 id.
7, 3d.2 Id. at 375-76.
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purpose of transmitting information. 3 This network has under-
gone enormous growth in recent years: the number of linked
computers has grown from fewer than 300 in 1981 to over
9,400,000 by 1996.14 Approximately 60% of these computers are
estimated to be located within the United States, excluding per-
sonal computers.75 As many as 40 million people worldwide use
the Internet, and that number is expected to grow to 200 mil-
lion by 1999.76
No single person or organization controls or administers
the Internet-it exists because individuals have chosen voluntar-
ily to use common data transfer protocols to transmit informa-
tion.7 There is no single point at which the Internet is
administered, and it would be technically infeasible for any en-
tity to control the enormous amount of information transmitted
over the system.78
Users can access the Internet either by connecting to the
network on a personal computer through a modem, or by using
a computer that is directly connected to the Internet.79 Access
can be gained at schools, businesses, libraries, or storefront
"computer coffee shops."s Individuals can also gain access to
71 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-31 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The Internet was
created as an experimental project of the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA)
in the late 1960s. ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET USER'S GUIDE AND CATALOG 13 (2d
ed. 1994). This system, dubbed ARPANET, linked computers owned by the military,
defense contractors, and university laboratories engaged in military research. Id at
13. The purpose of the network was to "rapidly transmit[] communications without
direct human involvement or control, and with the automatic ability to re-route
communications if one or more individual links were damaged or otherwise unavail-
able," perhaps due to war. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831. As ARPANET eventually grew
to include universities, corporations, and individuals worldwide, the network became
known as the DARPA Internet and ultimately the Internet. Id.




KROL, supra note 73, at 16.
7" Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 832.
7 STEvE LAMBERT & WALT HOwE, INTERNET BAsics 4 (1993). The district court
found that:
[I] t takes several steps to enter cyberspace. At the most fundamental level, a user
must have access to a computer with the ability to reach the Internet (typically by
way of a modem). A user must then direct the computer to connect with the ac-
cess provider, enter a password, and enter the appropriate commands to find
particular data.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 832-33.
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the Internet through noncommercial Internet service providers
or commercial online services, which allow users to dial in to a
local telephone number and connect their personal computers
to the Internet.8'
After connecting to the Internet, users may communicate
with each other using a variety of methods.8 2 One-to-one mes-
saging (such as e-mail) allows a sender to address and transmit a
.message to one or more people 5 One-to-many messaging
(such as listserv) allows a person to subscribe to a mailing list
and receive messages that are forwarded to subscribers.'" Like-
wise, a recipient's reply to the message can be viewed by all the
subscribers. Distributed message databases (such as USENET
newsgroups) are similar to listservs, except that a user need not
subscribe to the database; he or she may access it at any time. 6
Real time communication (such as Internet Relay Chat, or
IRC), rather than fora where messages are posted and later
read, allows users to converse in an immediate dialogue with
other users. 7 Real time remote computer utilization (such as
telnet) provides users with the resources of remote computers
in real time, for such purposes as browsing a distant library's
card catalogue.
Remote information retrieval, perhaps the most familiar
means of Internet communication, allows users to search for
and retrieve information located on remote computers. 9 There
are three basic methods of locating and retrieving information
on the Internet.9° File transfer protocol (ftp) lists the names of
computer files on remote computers and transfers those files to
a local computer.9' Another program, gopher, similarly guides a
8'LAMBERT & HOWvE, supra note 79, at 4-5.
2Id. at 11.
83 Id. at 11-12.
'8 Id. at 13-14.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 834.
LAMBERT & HoWE, supra note 79, at 14-15.
Id. at 87. "IRC is analogous to a telephone party line, using a computer and key-
board rather than a telephone." Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 834. Perhaps a better analogy
is to a teletype machine, used by hearing-impaired individuals to converse over tele-
phone lines.
'3 LAMBERT & HowE, supra note 79, at 15.
" Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 834.
9 Id-
"EXROL, supra note 73, at 65; LAMBE-RT & HOWE, supra note 79, at 12.
1998] 1025
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user's search through the available resources on a remote com-
912puter. Finally, the World Wide Web "utilizes a 'hypertext'
formatting language called hypertext markup language
(HTML), and programs that 'browse' the Web can display
HTML documents containing text, images, sound, animation
and moving video."03 HTML documents often include links to
other resources, so, while viewing an HTML document that con-
tains such a hyperlink, one can "click" a computer mouse but-
ton and immediately access the linked document.'
Several systems have been designed to enable users of the
Web to search for particular information.9s These search en-
gines seek out Web sites with certain categories of information
or key words.9 After inputting the desired category or key word,
the search engine presents the user with a list of sites containing
the information.97 This list is actually a series of hyperlinks to
the selected sites and short descriptions of the sites' contents.98
The user then selects those sites he or she wishes to visit.99
D. PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET
Sexually explicit material, including text, chat, bulletin
boards, and newsgroups, exists on the Internet.10° This material
9
2 KROL, supra note 73, at 233; LAMBERT & HOWE, supra note 79, at 16.
'"Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 835. See also KROL, supra note 73, at 287-88; LAMBERT &
HOWE, supra note 79, at 17-18, 164-65.
" KROL, supra note 73, at 288. Hyperlinks are typically sections of text that are blue
or underlined, and when the user clicks a mouse button on the highlighted link the
desired text instantly appears on the computer screen. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836.
95 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 837.96Id.
97 Id.
99Id.
"0 Id. at 844. In assessing the pervasiveness of Internet pornography, the Senate
debate was influenced by a cover article in Time magazine. See 141 CONG. REc. S9017;
Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 38, reprinted
in 141 CONG. REc. S9019-21. The article, in turn, referenced a study on cyberporn
that appeared in the Georgetown Law JournaL See Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography
on the Information Superhighway. A Survey of 917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and
Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Coun-
tries, Provinces, and Territories, 83 GEO. L.J. 1849 (1995). The author of the study,
Marty Rimm, was a 30-year-old senior at Carnegie Mellon University who "had a his-
tory of involvement in media stunts and wild self-promotion." JONATHAN WALLACE &
MARK MANGAN, SEX, LAWS AND CYBERSPACE 127-28 (1996). Rimm's study concluded
that on Usenet newsgroups where digitized images are stored, 83.5% of the pictures
were pornographic. Id. at 126. In the weeks after the study appeared in Time, Rimm's
methodology was attacked from several fronts, eventually prompting both Time and
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is created, named, and posted in the same manner as
non-sexual material.' 1 A search engine accidentally may re-
trieve sexually explicit material through an imprecise search.
0 2
However, "users seldom encounter [sexually explicit] content
'by accident." 03 A document's title or an abstract of the con-
tent usually appears before the user may view the document. °4
There is currently no effective way to determine the age or
identity of a user accessing material through e-mail, listservs,
newsgroups, or chat rooms.0 5 Further, even if technology were
available to block the access of minors to these fora,
there is no method by which the creators of newsgroups which contain
discussions of art, politics or any other subject that could potentially
elicit "indecent" contributions could limit the blocking of access by mi-
nors to such "indecent" material and still allow them access to the re-
maining content, even if the overwhelming majority of that content was
not indecent.' 6
However, current technology does enable the operator of a
World Wide Web server to limit access by minors.07 A Web
document can include a fill-in-the-blank form that requests in-
formation from a would-be viewer of the Web site.08 The Web
server then could screen visitors by requesting a credit card
number or adult password.'0
Carnegie Mellon to distance themselves from the study. Id. at 129-52. See also Robert
Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon's Communications Decency Act: Regulating
the Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. CoMM. LJ. 51, 53-57 (1996).
"But the damage had already been done-Senators Grassley and Exon had waved the
Time article around Congress; Senator Coats had quoted Rimm's phony statistics."
WALLAOCE& MGA, supra, at 151.
101 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844.
,'Id. Imprecise searches also retrieve irrelevant material that is not sexually ex-
plicit. Id.
103 Id.
' Id. "Almost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the con-
tent." Id. The Government's witness in Reno, Agent Howard Schmidt, Director of the
Air Force Office of Special Investigation, admitted that the "odds are slim" that a user
would encounter sexually explicit material accidentally. Id. at 844-45.
10" Id. at 845. The Government's expert, Dr. Olsen, agreed that no currently avail-
able technology could give a speaker assurance that the participants in a particular
mail exploder, newsgroup, or chat room are all adults. Id.
106 Id.
07 d.
1'0 Id. The information would be processed by a computer program, usually a
Common Gateway Interface (cgi) script. Id.
"' Id. However, the district court noted:
Content providers who publish on the World Wide Web via one of the large
commercial online services, such as America Online or CompuServe, could not
1998] 1027
1028 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 88
The Government contended that the CDA creates three af-
firmative defenses for all content providers: credit card verifica-
tion; adult verification by password or identification number;
and "tagging."10 At present, none of these proposals is feasible,
for either technological or practical reasons."'
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Immediately after President Clinton signed the Communi-
cations Decency Act into law on February 8, 1996, twenty plain-
tiffs" 2 brought suit against United States Attorney General Janet
Reno and the United States Justice Department challenging the
constitutionality of two of its provisions."3 The plaintiffs alleged
that the provisions conflicted with the free speech clause of the
First Amendment.14 One week later, Judge Ronald L. Buckwal-
ter of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania entered a temporary restraining order against
use an online age verification system that requires cgi script because the server
software of the online services available to subscribers cannot process cgi scripts.
There is no method currently available for Web page publishers who lack access
to cgi scripts to screen recipients for age.
Id. at 845-46. See supra note 108. While it is quite common for "adult" Web sites to
require information from their visitors, "a modest number of freely accessible Web
sites containing hard core pornography still exist on the Web." Bilstad, supra note 69,
at 339.
"0 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 846. See Brief for Appellant at 34-38, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.
Ct. 2329 (1997) (No. 96-511). Tagging requires content providers to label all "inde-
cent" or "patently offensive" material by imbedding a string of characters, such as
"XXX," in the Web site's address or program. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 847.
. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 846-48.
112 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2339 n.27 (1997). Those plaintiffs were: Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union; Human Rights Watch; Electronic Privacy Information Cen-
ter; Electronic Frontier Foundation; Journalism Education Association; Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility; National Writers Union; Clarinet Communica-
tions Corp.; Institute for Global Communications; Stop Prisoner Rape; AIDS Educa-
tion Global Information System; Bibliobytes; Queer Resources Directory; Critical Path
AIDS Project, Inc.; Wildcat Press, Inc.; Declan McCullagh dba Justice on Campus;
Brock Meeks dba Cyberwire Dispatch;John Troyer dba The Safer Sex Page; Jonathan
Wallace dba The Ethical Spectacle; and Planned Parenthood Federation of America,
Inc.
'" 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a) (1) (B), (d) (Supp. 1997). See supra notes 65, 66.
.. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2339. The First Amendment reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
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enforcement of § 223(a) (1) (B) (ii) as it applies to indecent
communications, based upon a finding that the term "indecent"
was too vague to support a criminal prosecution. 5 A second ac-
tion was subsequently initiated by an additional twenty-seven
plaintiffs, 6 and the cases were consolidated for a hearing before
a threejudge district court.17
At the parties' urging, extensive evidentiary hearings were
held,"8 which, combined with a detailed stipulation between the
parties, allowed the district court to make findings as to the na-
ture and history of the Internet, and the existence and accessi-
bility of pornography on the Internet. 9 Significantly, the court
found that "[c] ommunications over the Internet do not 'invade'
an individual's home or appear on one's computer unbidden.
Users seldom encounter content 'by accident.""' 2 Further, the
court noted, despite the development of ratings systems2  and
"' Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2339.
"' Id. at 2339 n.28. Those plaintiffs were: American Library Association; America
Online, Inc.; American Booksellers Association, Inc.; American Booksellers Founda-
tion for Free Expression; American Society of Newspaper Editors; Apple Computer,
Inc.; Association of American Publishers, Inc.; Association of Publishers, Editors and
Writers; Citizens Internet Empowerment Coalition; Commercial Internet Exchange
Association; CompuServe, Inc.; Families Against Internet Censorship; Freedom to
Read Foundation, Inc.; Health Sciences Libraries Consortium; Hotwired Ventures
LLC; Interactive Digital Software Association; Interactive Services Association; Maga-
zine Publishers of America; Microsoft Corp.; The Microsoft Network, LLC; National
Press Photographers Association; Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc;
Newspaper Association of America; Opnet, Inc.; Prodigy Services Company; Society of
ProfessionalJournalists; Wired Ventures, Ltd.
17 This panel was convened pursuant to § 561(a) of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, which provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any civil action challenging the con-
stitutionality, on its face, or this title or any amendment made by this title, or any
provision thereof, shall be heard by a district court of 3 judges convened pursu-
ant to the provisions of section 2284 of title 28, United States Code.
47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (1996).
The court consisted of Chief Circuit Judge Sloviter of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals and Judges Buckwalter and Dalzell of the District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania.
"1 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
"9 See id. at 830-49.
'
2 Id. at 844.
' The Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS), launched by the World
Wide Web Consortium, attempts to create "technical standards that support parents'
ability to filter and screen material that their children see on the Web" by enabling
individual content providers to rate content on the Internet. Id. at 838-39.
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computer programs22 to block out pornographic material, at
present there is no reliable method to shield minors from por-
nography that is not economically prohibitive to some users and
providers.
With each judge filing a separate opinion, the three-judge
district court unanimously found that the CDA's references to
"indecent" and "patently offensive" conduct were inherently
vague, and therefore found the statute facially unconstitu-
tional.124
A. CHIEFJUDGE SLOVITER'S OPINION
Chief Judge Dolores K. Sloviter was skeptical of a strong
governmental interest in regulating the wide realm of online
material that possibly could fall within the purview of the CDA,
but recognized that there is a "compelling" interest with respect
to certain material.25 Notwithstanding this concern, she found
that the scope of material regulated by the CDA was so broad as
to create a chilling effect. 126 Furthermore, she stated that the
terms "patently offensive" and "indecent" are so vague as to be
incapable of application.27 Thus, material deemed indecent in
one region of the country may not be regarded as such in an-
other.128 She also stated that the affirmative defenses established
" Examples of software released in recent years to limit Internet access to children
include: Cyber Patrol; CYBERsitter; The Internet Filter;, Net Nanny; Parental Guid-
ance; SurfWatch; Netscape Proxy Server; and WebTrack. Id. at 839-42. These pro-
grams do not appear to please everyone-the ACLU has threatened suit against Kern
County, California unless the county removes a program on library computers that
blocks access to adult-oriented sights. ACLU Protests Libray's Use of Filtering Software,
SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB.,Jan. 27, 1998, at 11.
123 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 849.
324 Id at 857 (Sloviter, C.J.); id. at 865 (Buckwalter,J.); id. at 883 (Dalzell,J.).
125 Id. at 853 (Sloviter, C.J.).
326 Id. at 854 (Sloviter, C.J.).
'7 Id. (Sloviter, C.J.).
128 Id. at 852-53 (Sloviter, C.J.). Judge Sloviter gave as an example the Broadway
play Angels in America, which won two Tony Awards and a Pulitzer prize. Id. at 852-53.
This play dealt with homosexuality and AIDS in "graphic language" and could be
considered unacceptable for children under 18-years-old in "less cosmopolitan com-
munities." Id. at 853. However, Judge Sloviter commented that uninhibited teachers
and parents might find it acceptable for 1lth or 12th graders. Id. Similarly, articles
on female genital mutilation, a routine practice in some countries, might be viewed as
patently offensive in some communities, even if presented in context. Id. Judge
Sloviter further commented that non-obscene material, such as photographs in Na-
tional Geographic of Indian sculptures depicting copulation, a written description of a
prison rape, or Francesco Clemente's painting Labirinth, might easily fall within the
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by § 223(e) (5) are not "technologically or economically feasible
for most providers"-rejecting the Government's position that
providers can avoid liability by "tagging" their material to allow
potential readers to screen out unwanted material1 2 Chief
Judge Sloviter also refused to narrowly construe the CDA as only
applying to commercial pornographers.s
B. JUDGE BUCKWALTER'S OPINION
Judge Buckwalter found the terms "indecent" in §
223 (a) (1) (B) and "patently offensive" and "in context" in §
223(d) (1) so vague that their enforcement would violate the
"fundamental constitutional principle" of "simple fairness,"1s1 as
well as the First and Fifth Amendments.32 He found that the
Government's assertion that §§ 223(a) and (d) would be ap-
plied only to "pornographic" materials was lacking in statutory
support, and commented that, unlike obscenity, "indecency has
not been defined to exclude works of serious literary, artistic,
11133political or scientific value.
Additionally, Judge Buckwalter stated that the Govern-
ment's argument that the material must be patently offensive
when considered "in context" did little to dispel the statute's
vagueness. The relevant context might be "the nature of the
communication as a whole, the time of day it was conveyed, the
medium used, the identity of the speaker, or whether or not it is
accompanied by appropriate warnings. ' ' The vagueness of the
statute, he commented, is aggravated by the distinctive qualities
of the Internet.'*"
prohibitory language of 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1). Id. She stated that the Government
presented no evidence before the three-judge panel that "it has a compelling interest
in preventing a seventeen-year-old minor from accessing such images." Id.
'29 Id. at 856 (Sloviter, CJ.).
', Id. at 854-55 (Sloviter, C.J.). Commercial pornographers are those who post
sexually explicit material on the Internet for profit, and typically require a would-be
viewer to input his or her credit card information before accessing such material.
"' Id. at 861 (BuckwalterJ.).
12 Id. at 858 (BuckwalterJ.). See supra note 114 for the text of the First Amend-
ment. The Fifth Amendment reads: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"" Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 863 (Buckwalter, J.). See supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
3 Retno, 929 F. Supp. at 864 (BuckwalterJ.).
'
5 Id. at 865 n.9 (BuckwalterJ.). Judge Buckwalter pondered:
Are the contemporary community standards to be applied those of the vast world
of cyberspace, in accordance with the Act's apparent intent to establish a uni-
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C. JUDGE DALZELL'S OPINION
Judge Dalzell found that the unique nature of the Internet
as a communication medium prevents Congress from regulating
the content of protected speech transmitted thereby.13 6 He ex-
pounded upon the dangers of regulating speech on the Inter-
net, including the squelching of protected speech among a
significant number of people. 137 He stated that, ironically, this
same regulation would have little effect on the commercial por-
nographers about whom Congress is most concerned.ss Judge
Dalzell noted that most Websites operated by these individuals
already have the safeguards enumerated in § 223(e) (5).9 Thus,
according to Judge Dalzell, the Supreme Court's First Amend-
ment case law required a "medium-specific" approach to judicial
analysis of the regulation of mass communication. " ° Because
the Internet is the "most participatory form of mass speech yet
developed,"'' 1 it is entitled to "the highest protection from gov-
ernmental intrusion."
From the district court's unanimous ruling that the CDA
was unconstitutionally vague and infringed on the right to free
form national standard of content regulation? The Government offered no evi-
dence of any such national standard or nationwide consensus as to what would
be considered "patently offensive."
Id. at 863 (BuckwalterJ.).
"6 Id. at 867 (Dalzell,J.).
.. Id. at 877-78 (Dalzell,J.).
15 Id. at 879 (Dalzell,J.).
,' Id (Dalzell, J.). Commercial pornographers typically require the user to input
his or her credit card information before accessing pornographic material, thereby
availing themselves of § 223(e) (5) (B). See supra note 67 for the text of this provision.
14 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 873 (Dalzell,J.) (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622 (1994); City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm., Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496
(1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490, 500-01 (1981); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978)).
141 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 883 (Dalzell,J.).
112 Judge Dalzell commented:
Four related characteristics of Internet communication have a transcendent im-
portance to our shared holding that the CDA is unconstitutional on its face....
First, the Internet presents very low barriers to entry. Second, these barriers to
entry are identical for both speakers and listeners. Third, as a result of these low
barriers, astoundingly diverse content is available on the Internet. Fourth, the
Internet provides significant access to all who wish to speak in the medium, and
even creates a relative parity among speakers.
Id. at 877 (Dalzell,J.).
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speech, the Government appealed to the Supreme Court,43
which noted probable jurisdiction. 4
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for a 7-2 majority, 14 Justice Stevens found the two
challenged provisions of the Communications Decency Act, §
223(a) and § 223(d), were unconstitutionally vague and over-
broad, and infringed upon the right to free expression.46
1. Searchingfor Precedent
Justice Stevens commenced his analysis by evaluating the
precedential effects of Ginsberg, Pacifica, and Renton.4 7 The Gov-
ernment's attempts to analogize its case to these precedents
were unconvincing to the Court.
48
First, Justice Stevens rejected the Government's attempt to
invoke Ginsberg v. New York, 49 explaining that the New York stat-
ute in Ginsberg was significantly narrower in scope than the
Communications Decency Act.'5° Under that New York statute:
(1) parents could still buy their children the regulated material;
(2) only commercial transactions were affected; (3) the material
" The Government appealed directly to the Supreme Court under the CDA's spe-
cial review provisions. Section 561(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 pro-
vides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an interlocutory or final judgment,
decree, or order of the court of 3 judges in an action under subsection (a) hold-
ing this title or an amendment made by this title, or any provision thereof, un-
constitutional shall be reviewable as a matter of right by direct appeal to the
Supreme Court. Any such appeal shall be filed not more than 20 days after entry
of such judgment, decree, or order.
47 U.S.C. § 561(b) (1996).
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
"'Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer joined in the
majority opinion.
,46 Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997). See City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Gins-
berg v. NewYork, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
,17 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
148 Id.
49 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a New York statute prohibiting minors from
purchasing material deemed obscene for them, although not necessarily obscene for
adults). See spra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing Gisberg).
"0 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
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regulated was limited to that "utterly without redeeming social
importance for minors;" and (4) the statute defined minors as
people under seventeen years of age, thereby excluding from its
scope a significant number of people nearest the age of major-
ity. T5 In contrast, the CDA operates as a complete ban on
transmitting "indecent" material to anybody under eighteen
years of age.
Likewise, Justice Stevens found Pacifica 2 inapposite: the
scope of communications addressed by the FCC's order in
Pacifica was significantly narrower than that regulated by the
CDA.'55  The CDA sought to control all transmissions on the
Internet-the most extensive communications network ever
conceived-which requires a user to take several steps to access
information and where there is a minimal risk of encountering
unwanted material. By comparison, in Pacifica, the FCC
merely sought to restrict certain language at a certain time of
day on a medium with a finite number of frequencies. 5
The Court also rejected the Government's attempt to in-
voke an analogy to City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.:56 "The
purpose of the CDA is to protect children from the primary ef-
fects of 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' speech, rather than
any 'secondary' effect of such speech."5 7 The ordinance in Ren-
ton, on the other hand, was aimed at preventing crime and
other byproducts of adult entertainment. 58
Justice Stevens chose instead to highlight the similarities be-
tween the CDA and the statute addressed in Sable Communica-
' Id. (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646).
"12 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC sanction of a pat-
ently offensive radio broadcast at a time when children were likely to be in the audi-
ence). See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text (discussing Pacifica).
153 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342.
... Id. See supra note 104.
"'Justice Stevens noted that "unlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress
first authorized regulation of the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be con-
sidered a 'scarce' expressive commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost ca-
pacity for communication of all kinds." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
5 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding zoning ordinance preventing establishment of
adult movie theaters when ordinance was only aimed at secondary effects of land
use). See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing Renton).
5 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334.
"' Id. at 2342.
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tions of California, Inc. v. FCC,59 which banned indecent "dial-a-
porn."16° The critical factor which mitigated against regulation
in Sable was the difficulty involved in accessing the indecent
communication. Justice Stevens likened the act of clicking hy-
perlinks in an Internet document to dialing a telephone, rea-
soning that children were unlikely to encounter indecent
speech accidentally in either context. Therefore, he reasoned,
the Government's scope of authority should not be as broad as
in Pacifica, where children could easily encounter the indecent
radio broadcast.
2. Is the CDA Unconstitutionally Vague?
The Court next responded to the charge that the CDA is so
vague as to violate the First Amendment. 6' Section 223(a) at-
tempts to regulate "indecent" communications, 62 while § 223(d)
refers to material which, "in context, depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary commu-
nity standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs."63 Be-
cause neither "indecent" nor "patently offensive" is defined in
the CDA,'6 Justice Stevens predicted that the difference in lan-
guage will create confusion as to what the terms mean and how
"29 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (finding unconstitutional an FCC ban on indecent tele-
phone messages accessed by dialing a telephone number). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 33-39 (discussing Sable).
' Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343.
161 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344. The Fifth Amendment vagueness issue alleged by the
plaintiffs was not addressed. IdR
12 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp. 1997). See supra note 65 for the text of §
223(a) (1) (B).
1647 U.S.C. § 223 (d) (Supp. 1997). See supra note 66 for the text of § 223 (d).
The legislative history does provide some guidance for the intended meaning of
"indecent":
The conferees intend that the term indecency ... has the same meaning as es-
tablished in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), and Sable Communica-
tions of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). These cases clearly establish
the principle that the federal government has a compelling interest in shielding
minors from indecency. Moreover, these cases firmly establish the principle that
the indecency standard is fully consistent with the Constitution and specifically
limited in its reach so that the term is not unconstitutionally vague.... The pre-
cise contours of the definition of indecency have varied slightly depending on
the communications medium to which it has been applied. The essence of the
phrase-patently offensive descriptions of sexual or excretory activities--has
remained constant, however.
H.R CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 422, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 201, 201-02.
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they interrelate165 The Court traditionally has been especially
concerned with vagueness in a content-based regulation of
speech because of its "obvious chilling effect on free speech."'6
This concern is especially meaningful when, as with the CDA, a
criminal statute creates the risk of discriminatory enforce-
ment. 67
The Government responded that the language of the CDA
is at least as clear as the standard for obscenity set forth in Miller
v. California.168 In Miller, the Court defined the qualities of ob-
scene material in a three part test.' 69 Because the CDA only
codifies the second prong of the test (with the significant omis-
sion of the "applicable state law" language), the Court ruled
that it is more vague than Milleis obscenity test. 70
3. Is the CDA Unconstitutionally Overbroad?
While acknowledging Congress's interest in protecting mi-
nors from certain harmful material on the Internet, 7' the Su-
preme Court refused to permit enactment of a statute that
would hinder severely the right and ability of adults to commu-
nicate in a constitutionally protected manner.'72 The Court saw
no reason to defer to the congressional judgment that only a to-
tal ban would serve the Government's interest in protecting mi-
nors 73 The District Court's findings regarding the inability of
'"Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344 & nn.35-37.
Id. at 2344 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991)).
,67 Id. at 2345. The Court used this risk of discriminatory enforcement to distin-
guish the CDA from the civil regulations at issue in Denver Area. See supra text accom-
panying notes 40-49 (discussing Denver Area).
'6 Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
'6" Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
170 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2345. Justice Stevens noted: "Even though the word 'trunk,'
standing alone, might refer to luggage, a swimming suit, the base of a tree, or the
long nose of an animal, its meaning is clear when it is one prong of a three-part de-
scription of a species of gray animals." Id. at 2345 n.38.
171 id at 2346 (citing Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978); Ginsberg v.
NewYork, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).
171 I& (citing Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct.
2374 (1996)).
'73 See Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989). In fact, any
claim that Congress's reasoned judgment should be given deference is questionable,
as the extent of congressional inquiry into the subject of the legislation was perhaps
insufficient. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346 n.41. As stated by Senator Leahy in his opening
statement before the SenateJudiciary Committee's hearing on the CDA-
It really struck me... that it is the first ever hearing .... And yet we had a major
debate on the floor, passed legislation overwhelmingly on a subject involving the
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users to prevent access to their messages by minors persuaded
the Court that a significant amount of protected speech would
be curtailed. 74 According to Justice Stevens, the Government
failed to explain why a more precisely worded statute would be
less effective than the CDA in restricting minors' access to on-
line pornography.7 As a result, he declared that the CDA was




The Government's final argument was that, should the Act
be deemed vague or overbroad, the unconstitutional provisions
should be severed pursuant to the CDA's severability clause, 47
U.S.C. § 608 ,' and the remaining sections construed nar-
rowly.'78 The Court refused to do so, except with respect to
§ 223 (a), from which the phrase "or indecent" was severed to
limit the provision to obscene material only.'9 Notwithstanding
this immaterial severance, the Court declared the CDA as a
whole facially invalid, thereby affirming the decision of the dis-
trict court.80
Internet, legislation that could dramatically change-some would say even wreak
havoc-on the Internet. The Senate went in willy-nilly, passed legislation, and
never once had a hearing, never once had a discussion other than an hour or so
on the floor.
Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problen, The State of the Technology, and the Need for
Congressional Action, Hearing on S. 892 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciay, 104th
Cong., 7-8 (1995). Cf Sable, 492 U.S. at 129-30 (no evidence in Congressional Record
as to how effective the FCC's ban on dial-a-porn would be).
" Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2347.
'7 Id. at 2348.
1
76 Id.
' Section 608 provides: "If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the
application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby." 47 U.S.C. § 608 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
'7 Rena, 117 S. Ct. at 2350.
' This change effectively eviscerated the provision, as obscene material is already
a proper subject of censorship in light of the Court's decision in Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973). See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (discussing Miller).
' The Government referred to a unique aspect of the CDA's severability clause,
which asks a court finding the Act unconstitutional to allow it to be applied "to other
persons or circumstances" that might be constitutional. See Appellant's Brief at 46,
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (No. 96-511). The Court rejected this argu-
ment because the statute that allows the Court jurisdiction on an expedited basis lim-
its that grant to suits challenging the CDA "on its face." See supra note 117 for the text
of 47 U.S.C. § 561 (1996).
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B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S PARTIAL DISSENT
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part. 8' She accepted the
majority's position that the CDA is unconstitutional insofar as it
prevents adults from exercising their right to free speech, but
she believed that a more narrowly tailored statute would be
permissible under Renton's'82 "zoning" model.'3 In this context,
Justice O'Connor viewed the CDA as an attempt to create "adult
184
zones" in cyberspace.
Justice O'Connor accepted the Government's position that
§ 223(d) (1) consists of two separate provisions, rather than only
the "patently offensive display" provision recognized by Justice
Stevens.1 8s Specifically, § 223(d) (1) (A)'86 criminalizes the know-
ing transmission of patently offensive material to a specific per-
son under the age of eighteen ("specific person" provision),"s7
while § 223(d) (1) (B)' s makes it a crime to display patently of-
fensive messages or images "in a[ny] manner available" to mi-
nors ("display" provision),89 Neither these provisions, nor §
223(a) (1) (B) ("indecency transmission" provision), intend to
prevent indecent or patently offensive material from being re-
Additionally, the Government requested that the Court observe its previous in-
struction that absent "countervailing considerations," a statute should "be declared
invalid to the extent it reaches too far, but otherwise left intact." See Appellant's Brief
at 46, Reno (No. 96-511) (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503-
04 (1985)). The Court declined to do so, instead finding that one of the "counter-
vailing considerations" discussed in Brockett existed in the instant case. Reno, 117 S.
Ct. at 2350. Specifically, the Court may allow a limiting construction only if the stat-
ute is "readily susceptible" to such construction. Ia (citing Virginia v. American
Bookseller's Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988); Erznoznik v.Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
216 (1975)). Thus, the Court declared that the "open-ended character of the CDA
provides no guidance what ever for limiting its coverage." Id.
'8 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). ChiefJustice Rehnquistjoined injustice O'Connor's opinion.
182 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). See supra notes 50-
53 and accompanying text (discussing Renton)
Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2357 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
184 Id. at 2351 (O'Connor,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185 Id. at 2352 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra
note 66.
186 See supra note 66.
187 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
18' See supra note 66.
.89 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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ceived by adults, who have a First Amendment right to view or
read it.'90 Justice O'Connor therefore interpreted the "undeni-
able purpose of the CDA" to be the segregation of the Internet's
indecent material into areas inaccessible to minors.19'
Justice O'Connor noted that the creation of "adult zones"
has been long accepted by the states in a variety of contexts. 2
As such, she was willing to support the federal government's
right to zone the Internet so long as it does not unduly restrict
adult access and affects only material that minors have no First
Amendment right to receive.9 She recognized that the "dis-
play" provision, as well as some applications of the "indecency
transmission" and "specific person" provisions, fail to comply
with that limiting principle because it prevents adults from ac-
cessing constitutionally protected materials in certain circum-
stances. 4 Thus, in those particular circumstances only, Justice
O'Connor acknowledged that she would invalidate the provi-
sions.Y In closing, Justice O'Connor stated that she would up-
hold the "indecency transmission" and "specific person"
provisions insofar as they apply to Internet communications
where the party transmitting the information knows that all of
the recipients are minors. 6
V. ANALYSIS
Congress has assumed a Herculean task in attempting to
impose restraints on free speech over the Internet. The nature
'
90 Id. at 2352 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
... Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9 In support of this contention, Justice O'Connor enumerated statutes from 26
states and the District of Columbia banning the presence of minors in adult environ-
ments such as pool halls, taverns, and adult movie theaters. Id. at 2352 n.1
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'93 Id. at 2352-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While
the majority declined to rule on whether minors have a First Amendment right to
view material regulated by the CDA, id. at 2348, Justice O'Connor stated that no such
right exists. Id. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She listed statutes in 42 states and
the District of Columbia that deny minors access to speech deemed "harmful to mi-
nors." Id. at 2352 n.2 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'9' Id. at 2353 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Whilejus-
tice O'Connor believes this to be the case at the present time, she urged that the de-
velopment of a widely available, user-based program for screening out adult Internet
sites makes "the prospects for the eventual zoning of the Internet... promising." Id.
at 2354 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'9" Id. (O'ConnorJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"6 Id. at 2356 (O'ConnorJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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and purpose of the medium is to disseminate material globally
at the click of a button. At no time in history has it been so
simple to transmit information to so many people at one time.
While this fact makes the Internet a tremendously helpful re-
source, it also creates the opportunity for abuse. The wisdom of
imposing restraints on speech in cyberspace is an issue this Note
does not seek to address. Rather, this Note will address the Reno
Court's choice of precedent, selection and application of a
standard of review, and evaluation of the Government's zoning
argument.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF ANALOGY
The key to the Court's analysis is the selection of an anal-
ogy-some communication medium whose characteristics are so
similar to those of the Internet that it is logical that the same
degree of regulation as that other medium should be em-
ployed.197 As noted by Judge Dalzell, "The moving picture
screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck
and the street corner orator have differing natures, values,
abuses and dangers."'9 8 As a new medium, the Internet seems to
defy analogy to any other previously used system of information
dissemination. In Reno, the Government pressed an analogy to
the broadcast media discussed in Pacfica," while the plaintiffs
urged an analogy to the "dial-a-porn" telephone communica-
tions in Sable.2  The former would give Congress wide berth in
regulating Internet transmissions, while the latter would place
more restrictions on any proposed regulatory scheme.
The district court, while unanimous in finding the CDA un-
constitutional, was unable to settle upon a specific analogy.
Chief Judge Sloviter likened the Internet to a telephone sys-
tem.20' Implicit in this analogy is the possibility that the Internet
,97 See generally Jonathan Wallace & Michael Green, Bridging the Analogy Gap. The
Internet, the Printing Press and Freedom of Speech, 20 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 711 (1997).
" ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 873 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Dalzell, J.) (quoting Ko-
vacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson,J, concurring)).
"' FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See supra notes 25-32 and accom-
panying text (discussing Pacifica).
' Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). See supra notes
33-39 and accompanying text (discussing Sable).
0' "Internet communication, while unique, is more akin to telephone communica-
tion, at issue in Sab/e than to broadcasting, at issue in Pacifica, because, as with the
telephone, an Internet user must act affirmatively and deliberately to retrieve specific
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"could be regulated as a common carrier, which guarantees
greater protection from restriction than broadcasting, but
would still subject the Internet to more regulation than print."20 2
In contrast, Judge Dalzell urged that the Internet be regarded as
fundamentally different than any other means of mass commu-
nication-its unique qualities frustrating any analogy to broad-
casting or print.20 3 He framed the Internet as a "never-ending
worldwide conversation. '2° Judge Buckwalter avoided the anal-
ogy issue altogether.
Justice Stevens was clear in the analogy he selected-the
Internet is like the "dial-a-porn" telephone communications in
SabLe. 205 To Justice Stevens, the crucial factor is that the Internet
is less invasive than radio or television-i.e., one must take more
affirmative steps to receive information in cyberspace than
through broadcast media.
The Reno Court's reasoning is sound. Realistically, the risk
of a child accidentally accessing harmfully explicit material on
the Internet is quite low. 2 6 A carefully worded search on a Web
browser will exclude the vast majority of pornographic sites. For
those whose abstracts still appear, a user must specifically select
offensive sites in order for them to appear on the screen.207
Similarly, a person may only access pornographic messages
via the telephone by dialing a specific number. As noted by the
Court, this is fundamentally different from radio or television,
where unwanted content may simply appear without the con-
sent of the person listening or watching.208 The Internet, while
not similar to the telephone in all respects, requires an analo-
gous effort on the part of a person wishing to receive informa-
tion.
information online." Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 851-52 (Sloviter, C.J.). See Wallace &
Green, supra note 197, at 738.
20' Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 872-77 (Sloviter, C.J.). See Wallace & Green, supra note
197, at 738.
113 Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 881 (Dalzell,J.).
Id. at 883 (Dalzell,J.).
"' Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997).
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
"7 This would not necessarily be the case if a person posting information on the
Internet were to disguise its contents such that the abstract received was not indicative
of any "adult" material. In this case, pornographic content could appear before chil-
dren without their having any intent to receive it. The Court correctly did not ad-
dress this issue, as the district court made no mention of the possibility.
Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343-44.
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B. WHAT LEVEL OF SCRUTINY IS APPROPRIATE?
The Supreme Court validated the district court's applica-
tion of strict scrutiny for the CDA.Y In doing so, the Court
acted consistently with established First Amendment case law
wherein statutes regulating protected speech traditionally have
been held to strict scrutiny, warranted by the critical importance
of the First Amendment.210 This standard of review requires that
a court analyze whether the questionable statute was enacted to
serve a compelling interest, and whether the statute is narrowly
tailored to effectuate that interest.21' While the Court found a
compelling governmental interest in preventing access by mi-
nors to harmful material,1 2 the majority held that the CDA was
unconstitutionally overbroad in that it interfered with the right
of adults to engage in protected speech.1 8
The Court was correct in finding that Congress has a strong
and legitimate interest in protecting minors from the vast array
of pornographic material available on the Internet.2 4  Few
would disagree that allowing minors to view such material serves
no important function, and, in fact, may be harmful. While the
majority avoided the issue, 15 the dissent went so far as to find
that minors have no constitutional right to view material that is
indecent or patently offensive.1 6
However, the Government acts unconstitutionally when, ei-
ther purposefully or incidentally, it prevents adults from trans-
mitting or receiving material that is not obscene.21 7 Therefore,
in order to legislate pursuant to its interest, Congress may only
id. at 2346.
210 See, e.g., RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (finding unconstitutional
an ordinance prohibiting violence-inciting speech related to specific topics); Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (invalidating total ban on
indecent "dial-a-porn" telephone communications).
211 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 ('rhe Government may... regulate the content of
constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it
chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.").
211 Reno, 117S. Ct. at 2346.
21 Id. at 2346-48.
214 Id at 2346.
2,1 Id. at 2348.
216 Id. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968)).
"
7 Id. at 2346.
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restrict the access of minors to the Internet while preserving the
rights of adults.218
The unique attributes of the Internet make the Govern-
ment's task a difficult one.1 9 Once a person places information
on a Web page or bulletin board, that person has little control
over, or knowledge of, who gains access to it.Y Despite the
availability of screening programs, preventing minors from ac-
cessing indecent material while safeguarding adults' right to do
so is technologically infeasible at this time.2 Without requiring
the use of a credit card to access information, which for some is
prohibitively expensive, a person who posts material on the
Internet can never be sure that no minor will access that infor-
mation.
Compounding this problem is the fact that the wording of
the CDA is so imprecise. References to "indecent" or "patently
offensive" material are so vague as to be incapable of real-world
222 I sicapplication. It is incomprehensible how Congress could pass a
bill containing such language, until one realizes that the CDA
was enacted with virtually no examination on the floor of Con-
223gress or in committee sessions. If Congress attempts to pass
the CDA again (and it almost certainly will), specific language
must be inserted in the statute explicitly describing what acts or
depictions will be subjected to its restrictions. Barring such
amendments, the chilling effect caused by the legislation will
continue, and it may be found unconstitutional again.
Furthermore, the dispute over whether § 223(d) (1) is one
provision or two is of little practical importance. Justice
O'Connor conceded that the "display" provision is unconstitu-
tional. 4 Her view of the statute was that the "specific person"
provision is constitutional to the extent that it is applied to
transmissions where the sender knows that all the recipients are
under eighteen years old.2s Justice O'Connor would sustain the
218 Id. at 234647.
219 See supra note 142.
2" SeeACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,854 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
221See id.
22Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
See supra note 173.
2 Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2354 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Id. at 2355-56 (O'ConnorJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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"indecency transmission" and "specific person" provisions in
226these circumstances. Were the Court not statutorily con-
strained to analyze the plaintiffs' suit as a facial challenge, 2 7 Jus-
tice O'Connor's preferred construction would be a valid one.
However, the expedited review provision only allowed the Court
to declare the CDA valid or invalid-a fact ignored by Justice
O'Connor.2 The majority was correct in sustaining the district
court's holding that the CDA was facially unconstitutional.
C. FACIAL CHALLENGES AND THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED
A different opportunity would have been presented had the
Government opted to litigate the matter at the appellate court
level.2  While 47 U.S.C. § 561 grants the Government the right
to appeal directly to the Supreme Court, nothing in the statute
requires the Government to take that route.230 Assuming that the
plaintiffs had won at the appellate level, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, 1 the Court would have been free to limit the
application of the CDA to certain circumstances. In this situa-
tion, the majority might have been more inclined to follow
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor in validating the
CDA as it applies to transmissions purposefully and knowingly
sent to specific persons under the age of eighteen.3 2
D. ZONING
The most intriguing issue raised by Reno v. ACLUis whether
Congress legitimately may place restrictions on Internet com-
munications under a zoning rationale. The use of zoning laws
' Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
' See supra note 117 for the text of 47 U.S.C. § 561 (a).
22 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
2 The Government appealed directly to the Supreme Court from the district
court pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 561 (b). See supra note 143 for the text of § 561 (b).
2
mid.
221 Of course, the failure of the Court to grant certiorari is the most apparent risk
of this approach.
232 If Congress opts to enact a revised version of the Communications Decency Act,
it would be well advised to emphasize the application of the statute to users who send
indecent messages to people under the age of 18, with the knowledge that they are
doing so. Justice O'Connor and ChiefJustice Rehnquist would certainly uphold such
a statute, and, in light of Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the remainingJus-
tices would probably be more willing to do so if no significant chilling effect is fore-
seeable. Such a statute would, however, contain within its scope only a small
percentage of Internet transmissions.
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for the regulation of speech is merely an attempt to suppress
non-obscene expression the government would be otherwise
unable to control. To prevent disingenuous circumvention of
the First Amendment, courts should subject this type of legisla-
tion to the strictest scrutiny. Zoning laws should be upheld only
when they are directed at all uses of land which create deleteri-
ous secondary effects, without regard to the subject matter of
the speech in question. Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice
Rehnquist would go to lengths to allow such regulation, while
the majority is more reluctant to do so.
Under City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., a state may
adopt legislation restricting indecent, non-obscene speech if, in
doing so, it seeks to prevent the secondary effects of that
speech.s In the context of the Internet, an obvious question
arises-what secondary effects could possibly result? It is im-
plicit in the dissenting opinion that Justices O'Connor and
Rehnquist would view harm to children as a secondary effect if
Congress framed the statute as such.2 If this is the case, how-
ever, it is not at all clear what is the primary effect of pornogra-
phy on the Internet. Thus, the argument set forth by Justice
O'Connor is mere sophistry. A "zoning" law is no more than
the type of content-based regulation explicitly denounced in
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.2
Justice O'Connor apparently does not find this troubling.
Her willingness to allow Congress to circumvent the First
Amendment not only undermines the Court's position as the ul-
timate protector of constitutional rights, but also encourages
Congress to use creative theories for restricting the rights of
Americans to participate in free speech. If, at some future time,
the Court upholds a statute restricting speech on the Internet
under a zoning rationale, the very essence of the First Amend-
See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing Renton). Secondary ef-
fects envisioned by the Court's precedent include crime and decreased property val-
ues. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1985).
2, See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2353-54 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
505 U.S. 377 (1992) (finding facially invalid a Minnesota statute imposing spe-
cial prohibitions on expression of matters concerning race, color, creed, religion or
gender, while permitting abusive displays concerning other topics). See also U.S.
Sound & Service, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 126 F.3d 555, 559 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The
impact of protected speech on minors is a direct, rather than a secondary, effect, and
a regulation that singles out non-obscene sexually explicit material because of its im-
pact on minors is not content-neutral.").
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ment would be endangered; virtually anything could have an
impact on property values or crime rates. 2 6 Little could prevent
Congress, under a zoning rationale, from declaring that radical
political discourse engaged in on a street corner is subject to
regulation for its effect on the surrounding neighborhood. A
communist bookstore which might tend to decrease the value of
surrounding property s7 could, under Justice O'Connor's analy-
sis, be constitutionally regulated. The majority's reluctance to
embrace "cyberzoning" is prudent-the logical implications of
suppressing speech based upon a zoning paradigm threaten the
fundamental tenets of the Bill of Rights.
Furthermore, utilizing the zoning paradigm for regulation
of this type raises an equal protection issue.2H Congress passed
the Communications Decency Act to prevent harm to chil-
dren.2 39  However, sexually explicit material is not the only
speech on the Internet capable of causing this type of damage.
The Internet abounds with sites containing equally harmful ma-
terial; Websites advocating racism, violence, and sexism exist in
large numbers.4 In passing the CDA, Congress made no at-
"6 The zoning rationale is also novel in that it regards the value of private property
as a governmental interest worthy of being balanced against an individual's First
Amendment right to free expression. While the preservation of national order and
the prevention of imminent harm have been used by the Court to justify restrictions
on protected speech, R.A.Y and the Reno dissent regard maintaining property values
as a sufficient interest. This is a disturbing trend. Balancing a private property inter-
est against a fundamental right seems antithetical to the judgment expressed by the
framers in the First Amendment.
"' The Court in Renton rejected the notion that a zoning regulation must be ac-
companied by a study outlining the effects of the contested land use in the city. Ren-
ton, 475 U.S. at 50. Rather, the Court merely required the city to provide evidence
that deleterious effects have occurred in other areas (in Renton's case, a Seattle study
was used), and that the city reasonably believes such effects will occur. Id. at 51.
2m Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads in relevant part: "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws .... U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
2'9 See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334.
240 See, e.g., White Civil Rights Now (visited Oct. 23, 1997) <http://www.k-k-k.com/>
(homepage of the national office of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan); Stormfront
(visited Oct. 23, 1997) <http://www.stormfront.org/> (self-proclaimed White Nation-
alist Resource Page); Misogyny Unlimited (visited Oct. 23, 1997)
<http://www.oemail.com.au/-ksolway/misogyny.html> (a list of links "especially un-
popular with women"). These sites represent a number of similar sites found over the
course of one evening on the World Wide Web. They represent only a small fraction
of the whole, and the number of such sites will surely proliferate as the Internet con-
tinues to expand. See also Kelly R. Damphousse & Brent L. Smith, The Internet: A Ter-
rorist Medium for the 21st Centuy, in THE FUTURE OF TERRORSM: VIOLENCE IN THE NEW
MILLENiuM 213-24 (Harvey W. Kushman ed., 1998).
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tempt to protect minors from the deleterious effects of such
non-obscene speech, but chose to single out pornographers for
criminal punishment. This unreasoned policy clearly implicates
the Equal Protection clause.
The Court addressed the issue of underinclusion in Renton,
where the city failed to pass zoning legislation aimed at adult
businesses other than movie theaters. The Court reasoned that
the city's concentration on theaters was understandable because
no other adult businesses existed in Renton.241 The Court fur-
ther remarked that there was nothing to indicate that Renton
would not regulate against other adult businesses in the future,
should the need arise.4 2
There is a critical distinction between the situation in Renton
and that in Reno v. ACLU. In passing the CDA, Congress ig-
nored material on the Internet which can harm children, ex-
cept where pornography is involved.243 Nothing indicates that
Congress will ever attempt to regulate these other types of
Internet postings. Thus, to apply a zoning rationale not only
would be contrary to the purposes expressed in Renton, but also
would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
To avoid such a violation, Congress must seek out all
sources of harm to children, and legislate against them in a uni-
form manner. To do otherwise is to discriminate against pur-
veyors of sexually explicit messages while ignoring those who
transmit non-sexual, but equally harmful, messages. If the sec-
ondary effect of harm to children really is the subject of con-
gressional concern, the only content-neutral means of
eliminating this effect is to examine all of its sources. The Gov-
ernment's use of the term "content-neutral" to describe zoning
legislation is therefore misleading.
The truly content-neutral approach is one in which Con-
gress makes a bona fide effort to inquire into the sources of the
harm about which it is concerned, disregarding both subject
matter and medium in its analysis. Only after ferreting out
these sources should Congress create a legislative scheme to
deal with them. This a posteriori analysis is the only way to pre-
2 4 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1985).
2,
2 Id. at 52-53.
20 See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
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vent Congress from cherry-picking forms of protected speech
for regulation. Arbitrarily selecting instances of free expression
threatens to erode the protection the framers sought to protect
so forcefully.
VI. CONCLUSION
By invalidating the Communications Decency Act of 1996 in
Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court has ensured the right of
Americans to converse in a constitutionally protected manner
on the Internet. Congress's failure to carefully craft the lan-
guage of the CDA to conform to its narrow prerogative in the
area of censorship was properly noted by the Court. Perhaps a
more narrowly tailored law could pass strict judicial scrutiny in
the future, but such a law would necessarily regulate only a
small number of communications-specifically, those that are
obscene or intentionally directed at an audience of minors.
The Internet will remain, at least for some time, free of arti-
ficial restrictions. As a medium, it is not free of faults; the ease
with which users may access information creates the potential
for real and significant harm. However, this same characteristic
makes the Internet the most valuable communication tool de-
veloped since the printing press. The necessity of protecting
the right of Americans to engage in uninterrupted discourse is
manifest: 'Just as the strength of the Internet is chaos, so the
strength of our liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony
of the unfettered speech the First Amendment protects."244
GLENN E. SIMON
21'ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Dalzell,J.).
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